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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL ERNEST JOPES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT 
LAKE COUNTY RECREA-
TION BOARD, JUNIOR Case No. 8702 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
:MEADOWBROOK GOLF 
CLUB and JOSEPH MICHAEL 
RILEY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS JUNIOR CHAMBER 
OF COMMERCE OF SAUT LAKE CITY AND 
MEADOWBROOK GOLF CLUB 
STATEMEN'T OF FACTS 
These respondents cannot agree upon the state-
ment of facts in appellant's brief and submit the 
fo11owing to supplement and clarify plaintiff's state-
ment of facts. 
Appellant has not clearly set forth the fact that 
there is absolutely no connection between the Mead-
owbrook Golf Course, as distinguished from the 
defendant, and respondent Meadowbrook Golf Club. 
·The defendant MeadoWbrook Golf Club, for clarity, 
will be referred to as the Meadowbrook Golfer's 
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Association in this brief. Meadowbrook Golf Club 
is an association of some of the players who play 
golf at the ]tieadowbrook Golf Course, organized for 
social relationships between the players. It is a non-
profit organization, organized in 1951 and consists 
of both men and wmnen. Meadowbrook Golf Club 
has no right of management of the Golf Course or of 
the facilities, including the Clubhouse, and did not 
maintain any facilities, do any maintenance, had 
no control or right to control over James Michael 
Riley, the manager and professional of the course. 
( R. 304-306, 295) 
The Salt Lake Junior Chamber of Commerce, a 
civic organization of young business men in Salt 
Lake City, had no connection with the Meadowbrook 
Golf Course, which course, it is undisputed, is owned 
by Salt Lake County. 
The clubhouse was, and is, owned by Salt Lake 
County, and is the result of a conversion of a build-
ing that was on the property acquired by Salt Lake 
County. The abutn1ent in the passageway where 
plaintiff fell was a part of the original building 
and was left in place when the building was con-
verted to a clubhouse for the public. Neither the 
Junior Chamber of Commerce or the Meadowbrook 
Golfers Association had anything to do with the 
erection, maintenance, use or control of the club-
house building and facilities. 
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The clubhouse included a golf shop, card room, 
locker room, restaurant, dining room and passage-
ways. (Exhibit P-1) It was a public building owned, 
operated and under the control of Salt Lake County, 
with the exception of a portion of the interior leased 
to Mrs. Jesse Smith for cafe operation, (Exhibit 
P-25) and a portion used by James Michael Riley 
as a golf shop, and as authorized by his agreement 
with Salt Lake County. (Exhibit P-24). The lease 
between Salt Lake County and Mrs. Jesse Smith 
sets forth that the premises shal1 be kept open to 
the public during hours in the golf playing season, 
and authorized Mrs. Smith to allow reservation of 
the facilities of the dining room to golfers, the lessor 
and to the general public. The passageways, locker 
room, shower room and other facilities were not 
under lease to anyone, but were a public facility 
owned and operated for general public use by Salt 
Lake County. 
The Utah Open Golf Tournament had been 
promoted by the Utah Golf Association each year 
since 1926. The Utah Golf Association had trouble 
obtaining a place for the 1955 Utah Open Golf 
Tournament and James Michael Riley agreed that 
the tournament could be held at the Meadowbrook 
Golf Course by letter directed to Steven Dunford, 
President of the Utah State Golf Association. The 
Utah Golf Association then voted to hold the tourna-
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ment at Meadowbrook and Mr. Riley undertook to 
arrange the tournament. (R. 231, 232, 233) 
After the tournament was set for August 25, 
through 28, 1955, Mr. Jack Gilbert, as President of 
the Meado-vvbrook Golfer's Association, agreed to 
sponsor the tournament and later Mr. Carmen Kipp, 
as President of the Junior Chamber of Commerce 
' offered to co-sponsor the tournament with the 
Meadowbrook Golfer's Association. (R. 233) Kipp 
offered to undertake co-sponsorship of the tourna-
ment because of the civic responsibility involved and 
offered his organization to enlist the necessary sup-
port among the merchants, and to devote the neces-
sary man hours, time, and labor to put on the tourn-
ament. (R. 234) The management and planning of 
the tournament were under the direction of three 
general chairmen, Jack Gilbert, Carmen Kipp and 
James Michael Riley, and many committees were 
organized with the members for the most part being 
members of the Junior Chamber of Commerce and 
the Meadowbrook Golfer's Association. (R. 235) 
Exhibit 6-P lists the comn1ittee chairmen, assistant 
chairmen and advisors. The advisors, Steven Dun-
ford and George Schneiter were not members of 
either sponsoring organization and the Calcutta com-
mittee chairman and vice-chairman, Steve Dunford 
and Carl Davidson, were not members of the spon-
soring organizations. ( R. 290) 
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~ 
One of the committees putting on the tourna-
nlent was the Rocky Mountain Section of the P.G.A., 
and the plaintiff, Paul J opes was chairman of that 
committee, v,rith two assistants who were not mem-
be:ts of the Junior Chamber of Commerce or the 
r~1eadovvbrook Golfer's Association. The P.G.A. mem-~, bers held a dinner and election meeting during the 
course of the tournament at the clubhouse. (R. 242) 
The golf professionals, members of the P.G.A., spon-
sored their own tournament which was held in con-
junction with the Utah Open Tournament, the scores 
of the last three days of the Open being counted as 
~ the p ;~:~::~;~::::~~~::t~:· :f6~e P.G.A. spon-
sored their own tournament, exercised certain auth-
ority over the contestants in that tournament, de-
[ termined their own rules and allocated their prizes. 
(R. 296) It is nowhere claimed that the Junior 
Chamber of Commerce of Meadowbrook Golfer's 
~\ 
~: 
Association had any connection, duty or right con-
cerning the Rocky Mountain Section of the Profes-
sional Golfers Association Tournament. 
~ Among other activities during the tournament f~ was the annual Calcutta held prior to the tourna-
ment, and a social hour on the Wednesday preced-
ing the tournament. (R. 290) 
There were many sponsors named in the tour-
nament program who donated $25.00 to have their 
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names listed for their support of the tournament. 
The Meadowbrook Golfer's Association members 
and Junior Chamber of Commerce members donated 
work, time and effort. (Exhibit 6-P, R. 287) 
All proceeds from the tournament went into 
a common fund from which all the expenses and 
prizes were paid. The agreement for distribution of 
any profit was that the first $300.00 was to go to 
the Utah Golf Association and the co-sponsors were 
to divide the balance. ( R. 296-239) 
The Junior Chamber of Commerce furnished 
many committee members and there were 60 to 70 
members of the organization working at the course 
during the tournament for the full four days. Many 
wives of the Junior Chamber of Commerce members 
worked to successfully conduct the tom·nament. The 
Meadowbrook Golfer's Association men1bers worked 
on committees and various other jobs during the 
tournament. None of the Junior Chamber of Com-
merce or Meadowbrook Golfer's Association mem-
bers, or wives, received any pay for their time, ef-
fort and labor. (R. 287-288) 
A scoreboard was necessary to keep the public 
and players inforn1ed as to standings in the tourna-
ment, and J. M. Riley arranged to have this score-
board built by employees of the Salt Lake County 
Recreation Department. Riley decided upon the con-
struction and placement of the board (R. 261) The 
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m~ board was fastened upon the east wall of the club-
m~ house where the passageway extended from the lock-
IU4~ er room and golf shop to the cafe. (Exhibit P-1) 
The plaintiff Paul Jopes, a member of the 
l\m Rocky Mountain Section of the P.G.A., had partici-
~; pated in three days of the tournament play. He fin-
rum,. ished his third round of the tournament during the 
n~; afternoon of August 27, about 3 :00 P.M. As he 
~~ finished his round, he went to the golf shop hut 
could not get change to pay his caddy, so he walked 
m! from the golf shop to the cafe, bought a beer and 
1)[' got change. As he was walking back to the golf shop, 
!~ two men approached from the north and J opes 
~h stepped aside to let them pass, and stumbled over 
1 the north abutment and fell. (R. 119) 
m 
Admittedly, J opes and his golfing companion, 
testified it was dark in the passageway, but Jopes, 
upon cross examination, was asked by the attorney 
for the Meadowbrook Golfer's Association: 
(R. 178) 
"Q. And why, if you can tell us, didn't 
you see these large cement abutments?" 
"A. That is what I would like to know." 
J opes had been in the passageway five or six 
times and never noticed or saw the abutment. (R. 
177) 
Mr. Kipp and Mr. Gilbert knew where the 
scoreboard was located and made no objection. They, 
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however, had nothing to do with its erection, place-
ment or maintenance, and it was erected several 
weeks before the tournament commenced and was 
used for the Utah Women's Golf Tournament that 
was held prior to the Utah Open Tournament. (R. 
260) At the time of his deposition, and which deposi-
tion was published at trial, Riley testified: 
(R. 266) 
"Q. Who was it decided that the score-
board should be erected at that location?" 
Mr. Riley's answer: "I was." 
"Q. It was you who made the decision 
that the scoreboard should be erected there?" 
'The answer is : "Yes." 
Mr. Kipp and Gilbert testified that they never 
had any voice in the matter of the scoreboard erec-
tion and placement, and did not attempt to have 
any say about its placement. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I 
THE COUR'T DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE 
COMPLAINT AS 'TO THE DEFENDANTS JUNIOR 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF SALT LAKE CITY AND 
'THE MEADOWBROOK GOLF CLUB (GOLFER'S AS-
SOCIATION) 
(1) Defendants Junior Chamber of Commerce and 
Meadowbrook Golfer's Association were not 
possessors of the clubhouse or any part thereof, 
and had no obligation, duty or right of main-
tenance of the clubhouse. 
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( 2) Defendants Junior Chamber of Commerce and 
Meadowbrook Golfer's Association were not 
principa'l's of James Michael Riley and had no 
right to direct or control James Michael Riley 
in anything done by him in connection with 
the signboard or the clubhouse. 
POINT II. 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBU-
TORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT III. 
THE ERECTION OF THE SIGNBOARD ON THE 
EAST WALL OF THE PASSAGEWAY WAS NOT A 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURY. 
POINT IV. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE ACCIDENT 
WAS CAUSED BY ANY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART 
OF ANY DEFENDANTS. 
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ARG'UMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE 
COMPLAINT AS TO THE DEFENDANTS JUNIOR 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF SALT LAKE CITY AND 
THE MEADOWBROOK GOLF CLUB (GOLFER'S AS-
SOCIATION) 
(1) DEFENDANTS JUNIOR CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE AND MEADOWBROOK GOLF-
ER'S ASSOCIATION WERE NOT POSSES-
SORS OF THE CLUBHOUSE OR ANY PART 
THEREOF, AND HAD NO OBLIGATION, 
DUTY OR RIGHT OF MAINTENANCE OF 
THE CLUBHOUSE. 
Plaintiff in Points III and IV of his brief, 
briefly sets forth two reasons why it is claimed that 
these defendants and respondents are liable to the 
plaintiff for the conditions in the passageway, and 
which conditions it is claimed caused plaintiff's in-
jury. We meet the argument in the order it is pre-
sen ted 'by plaintiff. 
In support of his position, plaintiff quotes the 
Restatement of Torts, Section 329, comment (a) as 
his only authority upon the point that these defen-
dants were possessors of the land and therefore the 
lhibility of the defendants is claimed to be that of a 
possessor of land. 
1The Restatement of Torts quoted by plaintiff 
is as follows: 
10 
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'QTopic 1. Liability of Possessors of 
Land to Persons Thereon. 
"Title A. Definitions. 
* * * * * 
"Section 329. * * * 
"Comment: 
"a. Meaning of 'possessor of land.' The 
words 'possessor of land,' as used in the Re-
statement of this subject, mean: 
'' '1. A person who is in occupation of 
land with intent to control it, or 
" '2. * * *' 
"'Title E. Special Liability of Possessors 
of Land to Business Visitors. 
"Section 343. Dangerous Conditions 
Known to or Discoverable by Possessor. 
"A possessor of land is subject to liability 
for bodily harm caused to business visitors by 
a natural or artificial condition thereon if, 
but only if, he 
" ' (a) knows, or by the exercise of 
reasonable care could discover, the con-
dition which if known to him, he should 
realize as involving an unreasonable risk 
to them, and 
" '(b) has no reason to believe that 
they will discover the condition or re-
alize the risk involved therein, and 
" ' (c) invites or permits them to enter 
or remain upon the land without exercis-
ing reasonable care.' " 
The Restatement of Torts, Section 157, sets 
forth a definition of Possession as follows: 
11 
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"157. Definition of Possession. 
In the Restatement of this subject, a per-
son v1ho is in possession of land includes and 
includes only one who: 
(a). is in occupancy of land with in-
tent to control it." 
The definition of possession of land, or posses-
sor of land, as given in the comment to Section 329, 
comment (a) of the Restatement of Torts and that 
ginven in Section 157 of the Restatement of Torts 
are almost identical. The sections clearly provided 
that a possessor of land must not only be in occu-
pancy but be in occupancy with intent to control. 
The clubhouse was a public building, owned and 
operated by Salt Lake County, with portions leased 
to J. M. Riley and Mrs. Jesse Smith. The passage-
way, where the accident happened, was not leased 
to anyone, and was public property. Spectators, par-
ticipants and other people were in the clubhouse 
during the tournament patronizing the cafe and 
golf shop. The clubhouse is a public building open 
to the public and any one who may come there. 
People come during the day to eat, visit, and the 
public used the clubhouse for parties, etc. ( R. 258, 
259, 260) 'There is no evidence that there was an 
admission fee charged for the public to enter the 
clubhouse during the tournament. There was an ad-
mission fee to watch the actual play on the course. 
The clubhouse had nothing to do with the play of 
12 
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the tournament; it was a convenience for the public 
as a whole, a p1ace where they could eat, visit, buy 
golf equipment and clubs, or use for any other pur-
pose. The use of the clubhouse 'by Jopes had nothing 
to do vvi th the tournament. He went through the 
passageway to get change so he could pay his caddy, 
and to get a beer. The only business J opes had in 
going through the passageway was personal. He may 
have been a business visitor as to Mrs. Jesse Smith, 
but it is clear frorn any common sense understand-
ing of the situation that his being in the clubhouse 
was in no way necessary or in any way connected 
with his participating in the golf tournament. 
Plaintiff states that these defendants invited 
the people to come to the tournament. The mechani-
cal work of inviting may have been done, but the 
rules, regulations of tournament players, etc. was 
not the part of these defendants. The Golf Associa-
tions, Utah Golf Association and Rocky Mountain 
P.G.A. set up the rules, regu1ations and conditions 
of play. 
Plaintiff in his brief makes the bald assumption 
that the clubhouse was a necessary part of the con-
duct of the golf tournament. By plaintiff's own 
testimony, the first day he played at Meadowbrook, 
he never entered the clubhouse. He didn't need 
equipment, didn't want to eat, didn't want to shower 
there; therefore, he could play golf, be in the tourna-
13 
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ment, compete his rounds and do all things necessary 
without entering the clubhouse. Granted the facili-
ties afforded by the county v1ere for extra comfort 
and ease of people, but they were there for all the 
public, with no exceptions. 
In putting on this tournament, the Utah Golf 
Association decided where it would be played, when 
J. M. Riley advised them it could be held at Meadow-
brook, and that he would promote the tournament. 
Meadowbrook Golfer's Association and the Junior 
Chamber of Commerce entered the picture only after 
it was decided where and when the tournament 
would be held, and the rules of conduct of the tourna-
ment, entry fee, conditions and prizes were not decid-
ed by these defendants, and they had nothing to do 
with that part of the tournament. All these defen-
dants did was volunteer to take over some of the de-
tails and the work and labor and to collect money 
from sponsors. There is no evidence that they had 
anything to do with the Rocky Mountain Section of 
the Professional Golfers Association tournament 
which was conducted with the Utah Open Tourna-
ment. Pau1 J opes was chairman of the committee 
putting on the P.G.A. tournament, and it is just as 
logical to say that Jopes and the P.G.A. took over the 
clubhouse and possessed it as it would be to say that 
the Meadowbrook Golfer's Association and Junior 
Chamber of Commerce took possession of the club-
house. 
14 
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At no time did the Junior Chamber of Com-
merce or the Meadowbrook Golfer's Association in-
tend to control or attempt to control the clubhouse 
or golf course. The record is void of any evidence 
that there was any intent of these defendants to 
exercise any control over the premises. J. M. Riley 
had charge of the clubhouse maintenance, as an em-
ployee of Salt Lake County, (R. 2'72) and these de-
fendants never attempted to control or direct Riley 
in any way in the operation or maintenance of the 
premises. ( R. 273, 27 4, 293) 
The record contains not a scintilla of evidence 
that these defendants were possessors of the club-
house or the golf course. 
The defendants Junior Chamber of Commerce 
and Meadowbrook Golfer's Association were not in 
possession of the clubhouse or the course with intent 
to control the premises, and therefore the Restate-
ment of ~orts, Section 343, quoted by the plaintiff 
as authority for his claim of liability on the part of 
these defendants is not applicable. The basis of 
liability set forth in Section 343 is based only upon 
the fact that there be possession of land, with intent 
to control. 'Those factors being not proved by fact 
or inference, the section is completely irrevelant. 
(2) DEFENDANTS JUNIOR CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE AND MEADOWBROOK GOLF-
ER'S ASSOCIATION WERE NOT PRINCI-
15 
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PALS OF JAMES MICHAEL RILEY AND 
HAD NO RIGHT TO DIRECT OR CONTROL 
JAlVIES MICHAEL RILEY IN ANYTHING 
DONE BY HIM IN CONNECTION WITH 
THE SIGNBOARD OR THE CLUBHOUSE. 
Plaintiff and appellant contends that J. M. 
Riley was the agent of the defendants Junior Cham-
ber of Commerce and Meadowbrook Golfer's Asso-
ciation in the placement of the scoreboard on the 
outside wall of the passageway where plaintiff fell. 
Plaintiff makes no contention or claim that J. M. 
Riley was engaged in a joint venture with Junior 
Chamber of Commerce and Meadowbrook Golfer's 
Association, although it is contended that Junior 
Chamber of Commerce and Meadowbrook Golfer's 
Association were joint adventurers, and that Riley 
was their agent in the placement of the scoreboard. 
In determining the status of Riley, it should be 
remembered that the golf tournament was held at 
Meadowbrook Golf Course only after Riley advised 
the Utah Golf Association that it could be held there. 
The Utah Golf Association had held an Open Golf 
'Tournament since 1926, without missing a year. 
The Utah Golf Association was having trouble find-
ing a place to conduct the 1955 Open Tournament 
and James Michael Riley offered to have the tourna-
ment at Meadowbrook, as authorized by his employ-
ment contract with Salt Lake County. Mter Riley 
agreed that the tournament could be held at Meadow-
16 
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brook, the Utah Golf Association voted to have the 
tournament, and Mr. Dunford, President of the Utah 
Golf Association, notified Riley of the action of the 
association and the tourna1nent was set for the 
Meadowbrook course. (R. 231,232, 233) 
Meadovvbrook Golfer's Association and the 
Junior Chamber of Commerce had no say in the 
plans for the tournament, that is the plans for the 
tin1e, place and conditions of the tournament, but 
entered into the picture only after the tournament 
had been set. Riley could not put on the tournament 
without help from some outside source and so the 
Meadowbrook Golfer's Association and Junior 
Chamber of Commerce volunteered to do the leg 
work, planning, social events, and many other of the 
multitude of details necessary to put on the tourna-
ment. As part of the tournament, the Rocky Moun-
tain Section of the Professional Golfers Association 
was conducting its own tournament, by counting the 
last three round scores of the Utah Open Tourna-
ment as the scores by the members of the Rocky 
Mountain Professional Golfers Association for their 
tournament. The plaintiff Paul J opes was chairman 
of the portion of the tournament conducted by the 
Rocky Mountain Professional Golfers Association. 
( R. 242, 264) The Rocky Mountain Section of the 
P.G.A. exercised authority over their contestants 
in the tournament and determined their own rules 
and allocated their own prizes. (R. 296) 
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The scoreboard that was fastened on the out-
side wall of the passageway was made by employees 
of the Salt Lake County Recreation Department 
about 30 days before the tournament, and was used 
for the Utah Woman's Amateur Tournament that 
took place at Meadowbrook prior to the State Open 
Tournament. (R. 260) J. M. Riley decided upon the 
construction and hung it up on the wall. There had 
been some discussion about the use of scoreboards 
and the use of easel type boards, but Riley decided 
upon the construction and placement of this board. 
( R. 261) Two or three weeks before the open tourna-
ment, Riley discussed with the other members of 
the general committee and he brought up the idea of 
the board and placing it where it was because it 
would be out of the wind if attached to the wall. 
(R. 243, 244) The sign was put where Riley wanted 
it placed, and where it would least interfere with the 
operation of the clubhouse or golf course. Gilbert 
and Kipp, the other members of the general commit-
tee, never said where the board should be located 
or anything about its construction and placement. 
(R. 310) Ri1ey decided where the scoreboard would 
be located, and it was his decision. (R. 266) Carmen 
Kipp recalled no discussion about placement of the 
scoreboard on the wall and never made any sugges-
tion or direction concerning placement· of the board 
on the wall. (R. 291) 
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The clubhouse maintenance was under the 
charge of J. M. Riley. (R. 272) The members of the 
Meadowbrook Golfer's Association had no control 
of any kind over Riley nor could they give any orders 
or direction to Mr. Riley. (R. 273, 274) The Junior 
Chamber of Commerce has no right and did not con-
trol or direct Mr. Riley in any way in the operation 
of the clubhouse. ( R. 273) Riley was never told any-
thing to do with regard to the clubhouse at the time 
of the tournament. (R. 293) 
Meadowbrook Association and Junior Chamber 
of Commerce did not have the right to tell Riley 
where to put the scoreboard, did not have anything 
to do with its construction, placement, design and 
erection, and after i:t was put up, they obviously had 
no right to take down the sign, remove it from the 
wall or do anything else in connection with it. 
Considering first whether the relationship be-
tween Riley and Junior Cham·ber of Commerce and 
Meadowbrook Golfer's Association was master and 
servant, the Restatement of the Law of Agency, 
Volume 1, Section 220, defines a servant as follows: 
"(1) A servant is a person employed to 
perform service for another in his affairs and 
who, with respect to his physical conduct in 
the performance of the service is subject to 
the other's control or right to contrdl." 
There was certainly no evidence that Riley was 
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employed by the defendants Junior Chamber of Com-
merce and/or Meadowbrook Golfer's Association. 
He was not paid for anything he did in regards to 
the golf tournament, and received no part of any of 
the proceeds; in fact, he devoted time and effort to 
put on the tournament and to his financial disad-
vantage, considering the lessons he could not give 
and the decrease in golf shop sales. 
In the recent case of Oberhansley vs. Travelers 
Insurance Go., 295 P. 2d 1093, 5 Utah 2d 15, one of 
the questions involved was whether Oberhansley was 
the employee of one Pearce, for whom he was driv-
ing a car to Evanston, Wyoming from Ogden. Pearce 
had given him $10.00 for traveling expense. The 
former testified at the trial that if he had seen 
Oberhansley driving the car in the manner which 
might result in damage to it, he felt that he could 
tell him not to do so inasmuch as the car was his 
responsibility. In holding that the relationship was 
not master and servant this court quoted from the 
decision of Bingham City, et al. vs. Industrial Com-
mission, 66 Utah 390, 243 P. 113, on page 393, as 
follows: 
HThe usual test by which to determine 
whether one person is another's employee is 
whether the alleged employer possesses the 
power to control the other person in respect 
to services performed by the latter and the 
power to discharge him for disobedience or 
misconduct. Under the Workmen's Compen-
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sation Act it is also essential that some con-
sideration be in fact paid or payable to the 
employe. The purpose of the act is to pro-
vide compensation for earning power lost in 
industry, and the only basis for computing 
cmnpensation is the earning ability of the em-
ploye in the particular employment of which 
the loss arises. In short, the term 'employe' 
indicates a person hired to work for wages 
as the em player may direct . . . " 
The evidence is even more clear in this case 
that Riley was not the employee or servant of these 
defendants. 
Was the relationship between these defendants 
and Riley that of principal and agent? Agency is 
defined in the Restatement of the Law of Agency, 
Vol. 1, Section 1, as follows: 
"(1) Agency is the relationship which 
results from the manifestation of consent by 
one person to another that the other shall act 
on his behalf and subject to his control, and 
consent by the other so to act. 
"(2) The one for whom action is to be 
taken is the principal. 
" ( 3) The one who is to act is the 
agent.'' 
In the case of Fox vs. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 
56 P. 2d 1049, Justice Wolfe said: 
"The test of whether one is the agent of 
the other depends upon the right of control 
of one over the other." 
* * * * 
"Many cases have loosely used such ex-
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pressions such as 'for and on behalf,' or 'in 
the business of,' or 'for the benefit of.' As 
stated before, the inquiry must be directed 
to the question of agency in the operation of 
the car rather than to the question of agency 
for the accomplishment of some of some ulti-
mate purpose." 
Following Judge Wolfe's reasoning, the in-
quiry must be directed to the question of agency in 
the erection and placement of the scoreboard, 
RATHER THAN THE AGENCY FOR THE AC-
COMPLISHMENT OF ITS ULTIMATE PUR-
POSE. The ultimate purpose was to keep the players 
and people informed of the players' standings. These 
defendants were not principals of Riley in the oper-
ations necessary to erect and place the scoreboard 
and he was not subject to their control in the erec-
tion and placement of the board. 
In the case of Dowsett vs. Dowsett, 116 Utah 
12, 207 P. 2d 809, a boy in the Army requested 
his father and mother to bring his car to him, and 
the other was injured in an accident while the father 
was driving the car to the army camp where the 
boy was stationed. The mother subsequently brought 
an action against the boy upon the theory that the 
father was the agent or servant of the defendant. 
"* * * 'An agent who is not subject to 
control as to the manner in which he per-
forms the acts that constitute the execution 
of his agency is in a similar relation to the 
principal as to such conduct as one who agrees 
only to accomplish mere physical results. For 
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the purpose of detern1ining liability, they are 
both independent con tractors and do not 
cause the person for whom the enterprise is 
undertaken to be responsible * * *.' 
"If respondent had no right of control 
over the driver of his car, the court did not 
err in directing a verdict of no cause of action. 
As shown above, a principle cannot be held 
responsible for the torts of his agent where 
he has no right of control over that agent." 
(Ttalice ours) 
The evidence in this case is undisputed that 
Junior Chamber of Commerce and/or Meadowbrook 
Golfer's Association did not consent that J. M. Riley 
should act on their behalf, subject to their control, 
and there '\Vas no consent by J. M. Riley to act for 
these defendants, and subject to their control. Riley 
was not subject to contro1 as to the manner in which 
he performed any act relating to the conduct of the 
golf tournament and the record is void of any evi-
dence or inference that Riley was subject to any 
control by the Junior Chamber of Commerce and 
Meadowbrook Golfer's Association. 
iThe fact that Riley may have advised these de-
fendants that he was going to have the scoreboard 
erected and attached to the outside of . the passage-
way would not in any way give rise to any inference 
that he was their agent in the preparation and place-
ment of the sign. Riley testified that the Junior 
Chamber of Commerce was advised about the plans 
of putting the sign on the wall, but there is no evi-
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dence he asked for or got direction from anyone 
about the scoreboard. (R. 269) The co-chairman, 
J\1r. ICipp, testified that he never heard any discus-
sion about the particular sign that was attached 
to the wall and never made any recommendation 
or direction about that sign. (R. 291) Kipp also 
testified that at no time during the tournament did 
he direct or in any way attempt to control or tell 
Riley what to do about the clubhouse, with the ex-
ception of making arrangements for a party to be 
held in the clubhouse prior to the tournament. ( R. 
293) Jack Gilbert, one of the co-chairmen, and the 
Meadowbrook Golfer's Association representative 
testified that he had no discussion about the type 
and nature of the signboard being attached to the 
wall of the clubhouse, only that there was a discus-
sion of having the signboards in the patio where they 
would be protected from the wind. ( R. 309) 
!There is no evidence that Riley was the agent, 
servant or employee of Junior Chamber of Com-
merce and/or Meadowbrook Golfer's Association in 
any particular as regards the Utah Open Golf Tourn-
ament. 
POINT II. 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBU-
TORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Plaintiff Jopes had traversed the passageway 
several times during the four days he had been at 
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Meadowbrook, during the daytime and at nighttime, 
but never noticed the abutment. ( R. 177) He did 
not see the abutments and upon cross examination 
he was unable to state why he did not see them. 
The Utah case of Scoffield vs. Sprouse Reitz 
Company, 1 Utah 2d 218, 265 P. 2d 396, involved 
a salesman who visited the premises of the defendant 
company and ascended a stairway to a balcony or 
platform. There was no railing on the open side of 
the stairway and as the plaintiff left the balcony or 
platform he turned to descend the stairs and fell 
over the side. 'The court sustained the District Court 
direction of a verdict in favor of the defendant, and 
the opinion quotes with approval the general rule 
found at page 861 of Volume 38, American Juris-
prudence, which reads : 
"* * * As it generally is expressed, a 
plaintiff will not be held to have been guilty 
of contributory negligence if it appears that 
he had no knowledge or means of knowledge 
of the danger, and conversely he will be deem-
ed to have been guilty if it is shown that he 
knew, or reasonably should have known of 
the peril and might have avoided it by the 
exercise of ordinary care." 
Japes reasonably should have known of the 
existence of the abutment in the passageway. He 
had been through the passageway many times, both 
night and day. If he had observed and seen the 
abutments, he, in the exercise of ordinary care, 
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would have avoided his accident and injury. If ther~ 
was any peril in the passageway, he knew, or in th~ 
exercise of ordinary care, should have known of i1 
and then by any ordinary care could have avoidec 
injury. 
POINT III. 
THE ERECTION OF THE SIGNBOARD ON THE 
EAST WALL OF THE PASSAGEWAY WAS NOT A 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURY. 
At the time of the fall by Jopes he had beer 
to the cafe, purchased a beer, got some change tc 
pay his caddy and was returning through the pas-
sageway, which is approximately 1514 feet in length 
to the golf shop at the north end of the passage. 
(Exhibit P. 1) He walked carefully so as not tc 
spill his beer and because he was wearing go)j 
spikes, which he admitted made walking difficul1 
( R. 165, 119) . As he walked along the passage, twc 
fellows carne from the north and J opes moved ove1 
to his right, nearer the wall, and walked into thE 
abutment. (R. 119) There is no evidence that hE 
ever looked at the floor or looked ahead. On eros~ 
examination he was asked: 
(R. 178) 
''Q. And why, if you can tell us, didn'1 
you see those large cement abutments?" 
"A. That is what I would like to know.' 
It is obvious that J opes never looked to seE 
where he was going and whether it was dark 01 
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light made no difference. He didn't look and didn't 
see what was there to be seen in front of him. The 
fact that the scoreboard may or may have not made 
it dark in the passageway was not a proximate 
cause of the accident, because Jopes did not look 
and the absence of light was therefore not a proxi-
nlate cause of the fall. He had ample opportunity to 
look but failed to do so. 
POINT IV. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE ACCIDENT 
\'VAS CAUSED BY ANY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART 
OF ANY DEFENDANTS. 
There is no dispute that the clubhouse was 
erected several years prior to the accident and that 
an existing building was utilized, and the concrete 
abutments in the passageway were part of the con-
struction of the original building. 'The golf shop 
and locker rooms were at the north end of the pass-
ageway, a card room just west of the passageway, 
and the cafe just to the south entrance of the pass-
ageway. :The evidence and exhibits indicate that 
there was ample light from the golf shop, the locker 
room, the card room, the cafe and from the windows 
on the east and west of the main restaurant section. 
The length of the passageway was approximately 
151)! feet from the south to the north and was open 
at both ends. The south end opened into the cafe 
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area \Vhich had large windows and glass doors 01J 
both the east and west side. The north end opened 
into the golf shop ·which was lighted. It was 3:00 
P.M. on a bright summer afternoon. It is incapable 
of reasonable 'belief that the passageway was dark. 
Its short length and the fact that there were two 
open doors on each end, and it being a 'bright day 
outside makes any testimony that the hall was dark 
in the case not ·worthy of belief. Whatever danger 
there may have been in the passageway because of 
the presence of the concrete abutments cannot be 
charged to the defendants Junior Chamber of Com-
merce and Meadowbrook Golfer's Association. 
The only possible ground upon which the plain-
tiff can claim negligence on the part of defendants 
is that the scoreboard caused a reduction of light 
in the passageway during daylight hours. The evi-
dence is undisputed that at nighttime artificial 
lights in the golf shop and cafe were sufficient to 
light the passageway. There were no lights in the 
passageway. Plaintiff had traversed the passage-
way at nighttime and had no difficulty at that time. 
He had traversed the passageway on several other 
occasions with no difficulty. 
The plaintiff testified he did not know why he 
did not see the abutments, therefore he failed tc 
meet his burden of proof. He couldn't tell why he 
failed to see the abutments, and he cannot expec1 
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the jury to find as a fact something he could not 
even guess at himself, that the erection of the score-
board caused or contributed to cause the injury to 
plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants, Junior Chamber of Commerce 
of Salt Lake City and the Meadowbrook Golf Club 
(Golfers Association) were not in anyway respon-
sible for any defective condition of the interior of 
the clubhouse. The clubhouse was a public building, 
and these defendants could not be held liable in any 
way for the construction, operation or maintenance 
of the building. 'The defendant, James Michael Riley, 
was not the agent of these defendants and they were 
in no way responsible for the placement of the sign-
board on the wall east of the passageway which went 
from the golf shop to the cafe. The accident and 
injury to the plaintiff did not proximately result 
from any negligence on the part of the defendants. 
The plaintiff, as it appears affirmatively from his 
own testimony, assumed all risk of walking down 
the hallway and his own negligence proximately 
contributed to cause his injury. 
These defendants respectfully represent to the 
court that the judgment of the trial court dismissing 
the action as to the Junior Chamber of Commerce 
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of Salt Lake City and the Meadowbrook Golf Club 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN 
KIPP AND CHARLIER 
By ERNES'T F. BALDWIN, JR. 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent Junior Chamber 
of Commerce of Salt Lake City. 
By TEL CHARLIER 
Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Meadowbrook Golf Club 
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